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Documents Suggest CIA Didn’t Always Know Who It Was Drone-Killing

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In this Friday, Dec. 10, 2010 file photo, Pakistani tribal villagers hold a rally to condemn U. S. drone attacks on their villages in border areas along the Afghanistan border, in Islamabad, Pakistan.  President Barack Obama’s decision announced Thursday, May 23, 2013, to impose more restrictive rules governing U.S. drone strikes and his prediction that they will be used less could pave the way for better relations with key ally Pakistan as a new government takes power. Obama fell short of Pakistani demands to announce an end to the attacks altogether in a landmark speech, but his comments were seen as addressing some of the country’s main concerns over the CIA program. (AP Photo/B.K. Bangash, File)
In this Friday, Dec. 10, 2010 photo, Pakistanis hold a rally in Islamabad to condemn U.S. drone attacks on their villages in border areas along the Afghanistan border. (AP Photo/B.K. Bangash)

For 14 months — between Sept. 3, 2010 and Oct. 30, 2011 — the CIA did not always know who their targeted strikes were killing, according to a review of classified documents by NBC News. During this period, about 1 in 4 drone kills in Pakistan were classified as “other militants” — a catch-all descriptor used by the CIA to describe anyone killed whom affiliation could not be determined.

This raises questions about how the intelligence community determined what are actionable threats to national security. These strikes and the uncertainty behind them are attributed to the use of “signature” strikes, or the selection of targets based on their behavior and associates. A former White House official said that part of the selection criteria for targets is “circumstantial evidence.”

This is contrasted by “personality” strikes, in which the intelligence community targets terrorists using hard evidence gathered through visual surveillance, electronic communication or human intelligence. The intelligence community knows who it is targeting and where the individual is located.

“Signature” targeting, on the other hand, requires no positive identification.

Between 2009 and 2010, half of all drone strikes in Pakistan were “signature” strikes.

 

“Other militants” and the question of “signature” strikes

NBC News reviewed two sets of classified documents that detailed 114 unmanned aerial vehicle strikes over the 14-month period in Afghanistan and Iraq. The lists presented the locations, terrorist affiliation and combatant classification of those killed or injured in the drone strikes.

Half of those targeted were described as being associated with al-Qaida, but a quarter of the fatalities were described only as “other militants” — in direct contradiction of the Obama administration’s statements that it only targeted senior al-Qaida and Taliban leaders plotting attacks to the U.S. and American troops.

Four other strikes on the list had targets described as “foreign fighters.” Other strikes had uncertain numbers of casualties: one listed 7 to 10 people dead, while another listed 20 to 22. Yet despite the uncertainty, the documents described only 1 civilian death among the approximately 600 casualties.

“It’s just not believable,” said Micah Zenko, a national security expert with the Council on Foreign Relations, of the low civilian death count. “Anyone who knows anything about how airpower is used and deployed, civilians die, and individuals who are engaged in the operations know this.”

It is generally accepted that “signature” strikes could be effective, but the morality of such a program has made many experts uneasy about its continual use. However, despite the legal and ethical “grayness” of the targeting technique, there is little to suggest that the administration will turn away from it.

 

The morality of assumed targets

In a May 27 article from the New York Times — as the president’s new standards for ordering drone strikes against non-Americans were introduced — it was reported that, “Even as he set new standards, a debate broke out about what they actually meant and what would actually change. For now, officials said, ‘signature strikes’ targeting groups of unidentified armed men presumed to be extremists will continue in the Pakistani tribal areas.”

This quote came in light of the May 23 announcement by the president that the “Presidential Policy Guidance” will establish the same standard of targeting for Americans and non-Americans — that non-combatants will not be killed and that strikes must be in response to “a continuing and imminent threat of violence to Americans.” However, the guidelines were written in such a vague manner that the administration can justify and conduct extensive drone operations.

“It still leaves questions and doubts,” said Paul Pillar, a former analyst for the CIA. “One piece of phraseology that should raise questions is the somewhat oxymoronic ‘continuing, imminent threat.’ If a threat is continuing, how can it be imminent, except maybe at one particular time before it is finally executed? ” he said.

Thomas McDonnell is a professor of law at Pace University School of Law. In conversation with Mint Press News, McDonnell dismissed the assertion that civilians are not killed in “signature” strikes. McDonnell compares the use of “signature” strikes to the use of an Army company to sweep out and destroy enemies in a remote theater. In such a situation, it is not only possible, but likely, that civilians will be killed — if not from misidentification, then from collateral damage. The duplicity of engaging in a targeting method that hits civilians while publicly decrying the death of civilians sours the perception of the administration — particularly, in the Middle East, McDonnell said.

The administration projects that the use of “signature” strikes will diminish, especially after the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan in 2014.

Ultimately, the greatest critique of the administration’s drone program stems from the lack of transparency in the manner that drone targets are selected.

“Because the Administration has been so opaque, a left-right coalition running from Code Pink to Rand Paul has now spoken out against the drone program, fostering a growing perception that the program is not lawful and necessary, but illegal, unnecessary and out of control,” said Harold Koh, general counsel to the State Department under the president’s first term. “The Administration must take responsibility for this failure, because its persistent and counterproductive lack of transparency has led to the release of necessary pieces of its public legal defense too little and too late.”

Comments
يونيو 9th, 2013
Frederick Reese

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