BRUSSELS — Last week, the European Parliament endorsed a “readmission” deal between the European Union and Turkey, the main objective of which is to establish procedures allowing both parties to return foreign nationals who have irregularly entered or illegally reside in their territories.
In practice, this means that Turkey will be required to take back not only its own nationals found living illegally in Europe, but also undocumented migrants from third countries who entered the EU via Turkey, and vice versa.
In approving the agreement, the European Parliament chose not to hear the appeal launched by some human rights NGOs, who think the deal risks violating the rights of migrants and asylum seekers. The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) and Migreurop had called upon members of the European Parliament to vote against the EU-Turkey agreement until the full respect of the rights of migrants and refugees could be guaranteed at all stages of the readmission procedure.
While the agreement is signed at the EU level, the implementation will be carried out on the ground by EU member states. The EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström issued a statement, saying that returning foreign nationals to their country of origin will be carried out “in full respect of international law and fundamental rights.” The NGOs have pointed out that the “implementation of similar agreements with other countries has resulted in frequent human rights violations on both sides, including violation of the right to asylum and of the non-refoulement [expulsion] principle.”
Therefore, “the EU-Turkey agreement is all the more worrisome considering that Turkey is a transit country for a large number of irregular migrants and asylum seekers coming from third countries,” according to the NGOs.
Their concern is further exacerbated by the fact that Greece, whose treatment of migrants and asylum seekers has often been found in violation of EU standards, is likely to be among those member states that benefit the most from the EU’s readmission agreement with Turkey.
Another potential problem is that in recent years, Ankara has secured bilateral readmission agreements with several countries of origin of migrants and asylum seekers – mainly in anticipation of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement – to ensure that third country nationals readmitted from EU member states do not stay in Turkey indefinitely. In other words, if the individuals concerned are never given the opportunity to access an asylum procedure, it could lead to the chain expulsion of persons fleeing persecution or armed conflicts to unsafe countries.
This is also not the first readmission agreement signed by the EU. In recent years, the European Commission has concluded such deals with several non-EU countries on behalf of the member states. Similar agreements have been signed with countries including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and others, while negotiations are still ongoing with countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Belarus.
EU exports its migration policy
The European Union and its member states have concluded readmission agreements with some countries that not only lack functioning asylum systems, but also those whose authorities regularly violate the rights of readmitted migrants either through their detention practices, lack of economic and social rights, or chain-expulsion to countries where they risk torture and other violations.
Readmission agreements aim to facilitate the repatriation of irregular migrants to their country of origin. This is not the main issue, according to the NGOs, since states have the obligation, under international customary law, to readmit their own nationals. But international law doesn’t mandate that one country take back any third country nationals that used that country to transit into another country. Hence, by imposing them on its partners, the EU has increasingly used readmission agreements as a way to fight migration flows toward Europe.
The EU’s policy in this regard illustrates its growing tendency to rely on non-EU countries to reinforce its external borders. By signing readmission agreements with an increasing number of third countries, EU member states externalize their struggle against migrant flows to countries that are often much poorer and that have to bear the costs of acting as the EU’s border guards.
While the EU members states’ interests in the readmission agreements are clear, this is less so for many non-EU countries for which such measures may turn out to be very costly in terms of domestic support. For this reason, the EU has increasingly been linking readmission agreements to more comprehensive cooperation on labor migration management while simultaneously offering certain benefits such as development and technical assistance.
Turkey had long resisted the move, remaining steadfast in its unwillingness to accept the role the EU had wanted it to play. Ankara was first invited by the EU to enter into negotiations on a readmission agreement in 2003. By that time, the Turkish-Greece corridor had become one of the main routes for undocumented migrants – mostly from neighboring countries, such as Iraq or Iran, or from South Asia – wanting to reach Europe from the East.
Turkey’s initial reluctance to enter into negotiations with the EU was based on a broader political issue: accession into the EU. Having become an official candidate member state in 1999, the Turkish government had little interest in undertaking parallel negotiations on a readmission agreement as a mere “third country” party. As EU accession negotiations stalled, however, negotiations on readmission agreements resumed.
In a first instance, Turkey expressed its willingness to readmit its own nationals, in accordance with international law, as well as third country nationals with a Turkish residence permit. It did not, however, want to take back migrants who had transited irregularly via Turkey.
It was only after the EU applied strong political pressure that the Turkish government reluctantly eased its position. It argued that given Turkey’s geographical position and the volume of irregular migration flows transiting throughout the country, accepting irregular third country nationals would be extremely burdensome. For this reason, such a commitment on Turkey’s part would have to be matched by a European commitment of similar proportions with respect to other matters.
Visa liberalization
Turkey was offered financial and technical help to build up its border police and install border surveillance equipment, with the aim of making its borders with neighboring countries, such as Syria, Iran and Iraq, more secure.
But Turkey wanted more: the Turkish government demanded that readmission talks be linked to negotiations on visa liberalization for Turkish nationals traveling to the EU. The Turkish authorities also made it quite clear that the two issues would not be treated separately, and any progress on readmission negotiations would be made conditional on significant progress on the visa issue.
In the end, Turkey got what it had spent years asking for. In exchange for signing the readmission agreement, the European Union has now accepted Ankara’s demand that visa requirements be lifted for Turkish citizens traveling to the EU. It is obvious that the prospect of visa-free travel to the EU provided a significant incentive for Turkey to sign the readmission agreement — even to the detriment of the rights of migrants and those seeking asylum.